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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/629,910	07/30/2003	Roy Lillqvist	60091.00217	6100
32294	32294 7590 11/21/2006		EXAMINER	
SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY L.L.P. 14TH FLOOR 8000 TOWERS CRESCENT TYSONS CORNER, VA 22182			ADAMS, CHARLES D	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			2164	
			DATE MAILED: 11/21/2006	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)		
10/629,910	LILLQVIST ET AL.		
Examiner	Art Unit		
Charles D. Adams	2164		

		Charles D. Adams	2164				
·	The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence add	ress			
THE R	EPLY FILED <u>26 October 2006</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS A	APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR	RALLOWANCE.				
th p a ti	he reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on his application, applicant must timely file one of the follow laces the application in condition for allowance; (2) a No Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance me periods:	wing replies: (1) an amendment, aff tice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in c ce with 37 CFR 1.114. The reply mu	idavit, or other evider compliance with 37 C	nce, which FR 41.31; or (3)			
a)	The period for reply expires <u>3</u> months from the mailing date. The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A		in the final rejection, wh	ichever is later. In			
υ, <u>L</u>	no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire le Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or	ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailing	g date of the final rejecti	on.			
	TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 7	06.07(f).					
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL							
2. 🔲 T fi a	he Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in compling the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exte Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of th	ns of the date of ne appeal. Since			
	OMENTS The respondence to Standard of the Control rejection.	but prior to the data of filing a brief	will not be entered b				
(;	The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, a) ☑ They raise new issues that would require further co b) ☐ They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE belo	nsideration and/or search (see NO		ecause			
	They are not deemed to place the application in be appeal; and/or		ducing or simplifying	the issues for			
(d) They present additional claims without canceling a		ected claims.				
	NOTE: <u>See Continuation Sheet</u> . (See 37 CFR 1.1			(770) 000			
	The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.1		empliant Amendment	(PTOL-324).			
	Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s) Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be a		timely filed amendme	ent canceling the			
n	on-allowable claim(s). For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a)	· ·					
_ h	ow the new or amended claims would be rejected is pro he status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:	vided below or appended.	ii be entered and an o	ехріанацоп от			
C	Claim(s) allowed:		•				
	Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected: <u>1-12</u> .						
	Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:	•					
	AVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE						
_ b	The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but secause applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).	ut before or on the date of filing a N ud sufficient reasons why the affida	otice of Appeal will <u>ner</u> vit or other evidence i	ot be entered s necessary and			
e	he affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessar	overcome <u>all</u> rejections under appe	al and/or appellant fa	ils to provide a			
	The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation EST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	on of the status of the claims after e	ntry is below or attac	hed.			
	The request for reconsideration has been considered by See Continuation Sheet.	ut does NOT place the application i	n condition for allowa	nce because:			
12. 🔲	Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s).	(PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)/	~ <i>[</i>]				
	Other:	. (- Dorec	> .			
		QI IBED.	CHARLES RONES				
	•	OUPERM	CHAHLES RONES ISORY PATENT EX	AMINER			
				•			

Continuation of 3. NOTE: The amendments to the indepent claims 1, 9, and 11-12 and the newly added claims 13-15 raise new issues that would require further comsideration and/or search.

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

Applicant argues that Kim et al. does not teach an "Internet domain name comprising a plurality of succesive labels separated by dots". Applicant is directed towards the Final Rejection of 26 July 2006, section 7. Applicant further argues that dots and dashes are not functionally equivalent as delimiters to separate one label from another in the field of the Internet. However, Examiner asserts that dots and dashes are functionally equivalent as delimiters when writing strings and converting strings from one format to another. Applicant argues several experiments to show that "dots and dashes are not functionally equivalent".

However, the claims are limited to a method of "receiving data" for a database, wherein the "data includes at least one Internet domain name" (see section 7 of the Final Rejection of 26 July 2006 for arguments as to why Kim et al. shows an "Internet Domain Name") "comprising at plurality of successive labels separated by dots". The claims read as a method of converting strings of one format to another format. The method of the present application contains labels separated by dots. Kim et al. contains labels separated by dashes. As they are both strings existing in one format being converted to another format, the delimiters (dots and dashes) are functionally equivalent because they both serve to separate the labels. The choice of dots or dashes is read as a design choice, because the delimiters' sole claimed function is to separate labels from each other.

Applicant's argues that the "conditionally converting" step is definite. This argument is incorrect. MPEP § 2106 Section II(C) states that "language that suggests or makes optional but does not require steps to be performed or does not limit a claim to a particular structure does not limit the scope of a claim or claim limitation (Page 17). In this case, the steps following the "conditional" may not actually occur, because they are based on a condition. If that condition remains unfulfilled, the steps are not taken.

Applicant argues that the Office Action incorrectly considers "wherein the predetermined number of labels is three" to be a size. This argument is incorrect. The Office Action maintains the 'number of labels' is a size, for the question "how many" can be answered with a "size", wherein size is the number of items. Though the case law isn't directed towards the computer medium, the principle still applies. Claim limitations that are different from the prior art in items only in size are obvious. Paragraph [0033] of Kim et al. gives an example name address as "#042-123-4567". This address contains three labels, while the previously listed address contains four. This provides further evidence that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to simply change the number of labels

In response to applicant's argument that there is no suggestion to combine the references, the examiner recognizes that obviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988)and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, proper motivation to combine the references can be found in Khello, paragraph [0054], as listed in the Office Action of 26 July, 2006, section 10.

In response to applicant's argument that the references are directed towards a different problem than the present application, Examiner notes that even though the references and the present application may be directed towards solving different problems, the prior art still teaches the subject matter claimed in the present application. It has been held that a prior art reference must either be in the field of applicant's endeavor or, if not, then be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the applicant was concerned, in order to be relied upon as a basis for rejection of the claimed invention. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, both references are in applicant's field of endeavor.